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Abstract
In this article, we consider the implications of the ‘Prevent’ strand of the government’s counter-
terrorism strategy for the UK state’s engagement with Muslims. We argue that the logics of 
Prevent have been highly problematic for state–Muslim engagement. Nevertheless, we suggest 
that the characterisation of state approaches to engaging Muslims as a form of discipline is 
incomplete without an analysis of: first, differences in practices, habits and perspectives across 
governance domains; second, variations in approach and implementation between levels of 
governance; and third, the agency of Muslims who engage with the state. Through this approach 
we show how attention to the situated practices of governance reveals the contested nature of 
governing through Prevent.
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Introduction
The previous New Labour government, through the Prevent strand of its counter- 
terrorism ‘CONTEST’ strategy, developed a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counter-
terrorism that emphasised partnering and engagement with Muslim communities. A 
dominant theme of the academic literature analysing the significance of Prevent and 
counter-terrorism policies has been the contention that these led to the securitisation of 
the state’s engagement with Muslims, with participatory initiatives being introduced 
with the purpose of disciplining Muslim communities, or domesticating British Islam, 
in the process constituting Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 
2009) and ‘conditional citizens’ (McGhee, 2008). A number of studies (Birt, 2008; 
Heath-Kelly, 2013; Martin, 2014), drawing on theories of governmentality, have 
highlighted the disciplinary nature of state engagement with Muslims, manifested 
particularly in the enmeshing of security and integration policies and increasing state 
regulation of Muslim conduct across areas of social, cultural and religious life.
In this article, we consider the implications of Prevent for the UK state’s engagement 
with Muslims more broadly. In so doing, we argue that the logics of the Prevent strategy 
have been highly problematic for state–Muslim engagement. Nevertheless, we argue 
that the characterisation of state approaches to engaging with Muslims as a form of 
discipline is incomplete without an analysis of: first, differences in practices, habits and 
perspectives across governance domains; second, variations in approach and implemen-
tation between levels of governance; and third, the agency of Muslims who engage with 
the state. Through this approach we show how attention to the situated practices of 
participatory governance approaches to counter-terrorism reveals the messy and con-
tested nature of governing through Prevent.
Our analysis of the practices of governing through Prevent is based on research car-
ried out for the ‘Muslim participation in contemporary governance’ study (O’Toole 
et al., 2013).1 This study examined policies and practices of state engagement with 
Muslims, their implications for Muslim civil society organisations and Muslim 
responses to governing agendas, at national and local levels from 1997 to 2013. In 
particular, we analysed three policy domains where government has increasingly rec-
ognised or engaged with Muslims: equalities and diversity policies where recognition 
of religious, and Muslim, difference and identities has come increasingly to the fore; 
participatory approaches to welfare delivery and service provision where faith-based, 
including Muslim, organisations have emerged as key partners or stakeholders; and 
security and counter-terrorism, which has involved a Muslim community engagement 
strand as a key element of the Prevent strategy. Our study was based on policy analysis 
and 112 semi-structured interviews with government and Muslim civil society actors 
working at the national level and in three local case-study areas of Birmingham, 
Leicester and Tower Hamlets. Our sample included representatives from national civil 
society organisations active on issues relating to Muslims (e.g. Cordoba Foundation, 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), An-Nisa Society and Quilliam), civil servants 
and political advisors in government departments, including the Office for Security 
and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG), politicians and local government, faith and Muslim civil society 
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actors in Birmingham, Leicester and Tower Hamlets.2 Our interviews featured 
generic questions on the nature and quality of state–Muslim engagement, supple-
mented by questions tailored to our interviewees’ areas of work and expertise.3 Our 
data enable us to consider the logics and practices of state engagement with Muslims 
across policy arenas, and at different levels of governance, to address the question: 
what impact did the state’s engagement with Muslims through the prism of counter-
terrorism have on its engagement with Muslims more broadly?
In the next section we outline the core components of the Prevent strategy before 
turning to read the implications of this strategy through two conceptualisations of gov-
ernance through which Prevent has been interpreted: one as a disciplinary mode of 
regulation and the other as contested practice.
Engagement through Prevent
The Prevent strategy that was unveiled in 2007 in response to the 2005 London bomb-
ings was framed as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to countering al-Qaeda-inspired 
domestic terrorism. The provenance of Prevent rests in a broader strategy cumulatively 
developed since 9/11. Known as CONTEST, and launched in 2003, this contained four 
components including: Pursue (surveillance and detection); Prepare (civil emergency 
contingency planning); Protect (domestic security); and Prevent (tackling ‘radicalisa-
tion’). It is this last objective that has most overtly sought the participation of Muslim 
communities.
The Prevent agenda entailed significant shifts in the government’s relations with 
Muslim religious, civil and community organisations. ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ 
(PVE) or ‘Prevent’ initiatives focused on Muslim community engagement and 
capacity-building, with a particular focus on theological, youth, women’s and coun-
ter-radicalisation projects. Thus, the New Labour government set out to develop 
theologically based counter-narratives to al-Qaeda ideology by funding the Radical 
Middle Way project, and facilitating the creation of the Mosques and Imams National 
Advisory Board (MINAB) to create a UK-based system of mosque regulation. It 
reconfigured the mechanisms for the representation of Muslims vis-a-vis govern-
ment, with the creation of the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group and the 
Young Muslims Advisory Group in 2008, which bypassed existing Muslim repre-
sentative structures to enable the government to engage directly with Muslim women 
and youth. Through such means, as the Prevent strategy document declared, the 
government’s aim was to: ‘fundamentally rebalance our engagement’ (DCLG, 2007a: 
9). Prevent initiatives were facilitated by substantial funding. There were three gov-
ernment departments charged with delivering Prevent, each holding their own 
budget: the Home Office, particularly the OSCT; the DCLG; and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. Between 2008 and 2011, their combined Prevent funding 
came to £186,760 million.4
Tensions in the logics of engagement with Muslims under Prevent were evident from 
the start: on the one hand, the DCLG’s PVE Guidance noted among Muslims there was 
‘a tiny minority who oppose tolerance and diversity’, but stated nevertheless that a ‘key 
measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes among Muslims’ (DCLG, 
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2007b: 7). Fairly soon after its inception, Prevent was subject to extensive criticism. In 
particular, critics argued that the focus on Muslims, the approach to community engage-
ment through the prism of counter-terrorism and the overlap between Prevent and 
Community Cohesion policies securitised state engagement with Muslims (Thomas, 
2012) and cast Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). 
Kundnani’s (2009) report, Spooked, fuelled such perceptions by citing reports of Muslim 
youth and community workers being approached by intelligence services to provide 
information about the communities with whom they worked. This was denied by the 
government, with a Home Office Minister, Vernon Coaker, protesting: ‘Accusations that 
Prevent is about spying on people or criminalising vulnerable communities are simply 
untrue, and only jeopardise the vital work of Prevent to work with communities and keep 
vulnerable communities safe from radicalisers’ (cited in Birt, 2009: 56). This claim was 
undermined however by subsequent statements by the architect of the government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy, David Omand, who in his testimony to the All Party Parliament 
Group on Homeland Security in 2010 observed:
[Y]ou can’t divide government in two, into those people that go around spying on the population, 
and there are another lot of people going round to [i.e. engaging with] the population and they 
just don’t talk to each other. It just simply doesn’t work like that. (cited in Thomas, 2012: 118)
Suspicions about the rationale for Muslim engagement that was being pursued under 
Prevent proved difficult to dislodge. As a House of Commons Select Committee 
acknowledged, Prevent was widely perceived as a spying programme, with one witness 
characterising Prevent as ‘Pursue in sheep’s clothing’ (House of Commons, 2010: 8). 
The view that Prevent created highly securitised forms of community engagement 
appeared to be corroborated by the role of the OSCT in delivering Prevent, and the 
organisational overlap between security services and community engagement teams 
that occurred at the local level. In Birmingham, for instance, the Prevent programme 
there was led by a counter-terrorism police officer who had been seconded from the 
regional Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) into the city council’s Equalities Division. A 
local community activist in our study commented:
Locally we’ve had […] a controversial issue with a police officer […] who was seconded into 
the Council. I can remember clearly very early on, members of the youth inclusion project […] 
said that it increased their own suspicions of why he was involved in it. […] And the very first 
question they were posing to [him] was, ‘This is security-led, intelligence-led. Otherwise you 
wouldn’t be here.’
Husband and Alam (2011) point out that the multi-agency nature of its delivery meant 
that on the ground Prevent came to permeate a wide range of policy areas. Consequently, 
as many argue, a host of policies, including integration, Cohesion and civil renewal poli-
cies, became problematically linked to counter-terrorism (Thomas, 2012). Many 
respondents in our study concurred with the belief that engagement conducted through 
Prevent was securitised, with concerns about political extremism displacing other issues. 
As one former adviser to the DCLG, Alveena Malik, told us: ‘equality and diversity 
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wasn’t seen as an issue. It wasn’t seen as certainly a solution. It was around how do we 
deradicalise?’ The contention that engagement through Prevent constituted a limited 
offer of participation was widely substantiated by respondents in our study. As Alveena 
Malik remarked ‘there was this burden of responsibility and blame that we had to deal 
with which I found really difficult, which I rejected […] those of us who didn’t toe the 
line, we were shunned and silenced.’ Birt (2009: 54) concludes that consequently within 
government there was an ‘overemphasis upon counter-terrorism without engaging 
Muslims as citizens’.
Prevent as a Mode of Disciplinary Governance
A significant body of critical literature has developed analysing the various ways in which 
‘hard security’ measures, such as Schedule Seven and Section 445 policing powers 
enabled by prevention of terrorism legislation, were supplemented by an array of ‘soft 
security’ measures and discursive interventions – exemplified by Prevent – that consti-
tuted a developing array of managerial techniques that sought to know, reform and disci-
pline British Muslims. A number of Foucauldian-inspired readings have focused on the 
routine and pre-emptive ways in which government sought to inculcate discipline and 
‘self-governance’ among Muslims (Birt, 2008; Heath-Kelly, 2013; McGhee, 2008; 
Martin, 2014), in Foucauldian terms: bringing together ‘practices of the self with those 
of the practices of government’ (Dean, 1997: 208). Mavelli (2013: 161) argues that state 
responses to terrorism went beyond ‘exceptional measures’ and manifested themselves 
in a wholesale reorganising of ‘everyday “normal” political and bureaucratic rationali-
ties’. Drawing on actuarial techniques of governance (Miller and Rose, 2008), Heath-
Kelly (2013) suggests that government adopted a pre-emptive approach to managing 
security risks within the counter-terrorism paradigm in which Muslims were constituted 
as simultaneously ‘at risk’ (that is vulnerable to radicalisation) and ‘risky’ (posing a secu-
rity threat). This entailed a series of wide-ranging interventions in Muslim religious, 
social and civil structures, with the aim of reforming, managing, regulating and ‘disci-
plining’ Muslim conduct. According to Heath-Kelly (2013: 395), what developed through 
Prevent was ‘a more-or-less cohesive project of risk knowledge which [was] deployed to 
render terrorism pre-emptively governable’.
Birt (2008: 27) argues that through Prevent, government developed an array of mech-
anisms for the disciplining of Muslim subjects, including: the deployment of a set of 
reductive distinctions between good/bad, moderate/extremist Muslims, creating a lim-
ited repertoire of subject positions for Muslims (and see McGhee, 2008); as well as 
attempts to mobilise the Muslim community as a whole in combating extremist ideology; 
the reform of ‘conservative’ Muslim practices and Muslim institutions; and the promo-
tion of mainstream, liberal Islam. Despite this, Birt (2008: 28–29) observes Muslims 
have been ‘successful in disrupting the application of governmentality’ by acting above 
or below the nation-state – through engagement in either autonomous grass-roots 
organisations or global Muslim publics. Brown (2010) highlights a range of initiatives by 
British Muslims (such as the Muslim lifestyle and current affairs magazine Emel) that 
sought to present alternative perspectives on British Muslim identities and Islam in order 
to resist the subject positions offered to them by state discourses on Muslims, integration 
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and security – although these too were pursued outside of arenas of governance. Such 
perspectives seem to suggest that there has been little scope for Muslim actors to partici-
pate as autonomous or effective actors within governance.
Prevent and Governance in Practice
The logics and aims of Prevent have been highly problematic in terms of their position-
ing of Muslims as a security risk and poorly integrated into British society and the lim-
ited, and limiting, offers of engagement that have characterised participatory initiatives 
conducted under Prevent. However, we contend that the governance of Muslims through 
Prevent in practice has been less complete, and more contested, than many studies have 
allowed. Our account of ‘governance’ defines it in terms of ‘new processes of horizontal 
decision making and collaborative modes of governing between public, private, volun-
tary and community actors’ (Griggs et al., 2014: 2). This is distinct from ‘government’ 
that is typified by vertically integrated forms of decision making by public officials and 
political professionals. It is also distinct from the more expansive notion of governance 
that is prevalent in the governmentality literature, which focuses on a wide variety of 
state and extra-state agencies that seek to work on the conduct of individuals. In our 
critique of prevailing accounts of Prevent and governance, we highlight three conceptual 
and methodological issues that inform our perspective on its implications for state 
engagement with Muslims.
First, many studies of Prevent have focused on its discursive underpinnings through 
textual analysis of policy documents. More generally, McKee (2009: 473) identifies a 
tendency of many Foucauldian-inspired studies of governmentality to reduce Foucault’s 
interest in the ‘specific and concrete “art of governing”’ to ‘the rationales of governing 
as manifest in key (government) documents’. While the discursive dimensions of 
Prevent, and the logics of governing and Muslim engagement that are expressed in 
policy documents, should be analysed, we suggest there has been a neglect within the 
literature on Prevent of the material practices of governing (McKee, 2009: 473). With a 
few notable exceptions (Fussey, 2013; Husband and Alam, 2011; Lowndes and Thorp, 
2010; Thomas, 2012), studies of Prevent and counter-terrorism policy have infrequently 
engaged with the practices, and conflicts, that have underscored the development and 
implementation of policy texts. Yet, and crucially, as McKee (2009: 474) argues, ‘it is a 
mistake to ‘read off’ consequences from governmental ambitions […] for it cannot be 
assumed that […] power always realises its effects’. This is an important observation, 
and as our data show, through analysis of how actors interpreted, responded to or imple-
mented Prevent, we see that the practices of Prevent did not always cohere with the aims 
of Prevent that were expressed in various policy documents.
Second, many studies overemphasise the unity and coherence of governing strate-
gies. Yet, as McKee (2009: 474) notes, ‘governmental programmes and strategies are 
themselves internally contradictory, continuously changing and capable of mutation’. 
The dispersal of governing functions to a range of governance networks and partner-
ships over the last two decades, moreover, has created a highly differentiated govern-
ance terrain, with different government departments, networks and levels operating 
with different practices of governance. As ‘political fields’, the domains of governance 
are typically, following Swarz (2003: 151), arenas ‘of conflict over the definition and 
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implementation of public policies that are struggled over by political professionals’. 
The implications of this are that governance is increasingly dispersed and often inter-
nally contradictory and contested, requiring study of the range of practices of governing 
across different governance domains. Fussey’s (2013: 356) analysis of counter-terrorism 
policy is notable in drawing on a broader account of governmentality theory, in particu-
lar utilising Foucault’s theorisation of security and the specific loci of security practices 
as an alternative to a reified panoptical state, to provide a conceptual tool to analyse the 
diversity and heterogeneity to be found within counter-terrorism practice. Taking this 
approach, he contends that ‘heterogeneity and conflict’ characterise ‘the landscape of security 
practice’, particularly as it ‘becomes increasingly populated with diverse actors and agen-
cies’ (2013: 352). Consequently, he questions both ‘the extent to which ambitions for 
control are realised and the degree of coherency within coalitions of [counter-terrorism] 
practice’ (2013: 356). Our own analysis concurs with this more heterogeneous reading 
of practices of governing through Prevent.
Third, inspired by a Foucauldian disciplinary analytical frame, studies of Prevent 
have tended to focus on governing power at the expense of agency. Despite the availa-
bility of a theoretical account of counter-power within Foucault’s work, Bevir (2011: 
462) notes that ‘concrete studies of governmentality rarely examine agency as a source 
of discourses or as evidenced in specific instances of counter power’. This tendency is 
also noted by McKee (2009: 473–474), who suggests ‘this preference to disregard 
messy empirical actualities results in a fundamental inability to account for why the 
governance subject, constituted through discourse, fails to turn up in practice’. Yet, as 
McKee acknowledges, Foucauldian theoretical frameworks can, in Fussey’s (2013: 
359) terms, facilitate ‘an appreciation of the heterogeneity of control, incorporating 
diverse state and non-state actors, and the way in which security practices aspire neither 
towards total coercion or control’. We argue, however, that much of the ‘disciplinary’ 
analytic that has come to characterise analyses of Prevent does not do justice to this 
fuller agency-incorporating sociology of governance. The need for a more complete 
account becomes particularly evident in the dispersed and multi-layered delivery of 
Prevent and in its reception across different levels of government and within Muslim 
civil society. A more practice-based approach to analysing state–citizen relations within 
governance spaces can reveal the possibilities for citizens to effect more autonomous 
agendas than those necessarily marked out for them by governors. Taking such an 
approach, Cornwall and Coelho’s (2006: 11) account of the responses of citizens who 
are invited into participatory governance spaces proposes that they should be seen as 
potentially ‘spaces for change’, because although they are ‘invited spaces’, that are 
‘framed by those who create them, and infused with power relations and cultures of 
interaction carried into them from other spaces’, they are ‘also spaces of possibility, 
in which power takes a more productive and positive form’. Proceeding with this 
understanding of governance opens up theoretically the possibility that actors within 
governance spaces may adapt or change formal rules of governance in ways which 
may depart from institutional design – sometimes with unintended consequences – 
necessitating ‘a larger role for contingency in understanding governance’ (Griggs et al., 
2014: 9). Such an approach recognises the potential for the exercise of agency by 
different actors in reinterpreting, appropriating, contesting or resisting governance 
practices.
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Through a practice-oriented analysis of how Prevent was formulated, received and 
implemented, we advance an understanding of its implications for state–Muslim 
engagement as contested practice. In common with Fussey’s (2013) account of counter-
terrorism surveillance measures, we show how Prevent was subject to contradictory and 
inconsistent logics and outcomes within government, and encountered modification, 
challenge and resistance – both from state actors at national and local levels and from 
Muslim actors acting within and outside of governance arenas. The following sections 
set out the empirical basis to our argument. We begin by showing some of the contradic-
tory logics of Prevent across government departments, and how these were met and 
contested by local authorities in different localities, before addressing responses by 
Muslim actors to the articulation and implementation of Prevent.
Logics and Practices of Engagement across Government
One recurring issue that emerged in the critique of Prevent under New Labour was the 
blurring between Prevent and Community Cohesion policies. This was underpinned 
ideologically by the conviction that Cohesion was necessary for Prevent, and operation-
ally by the overlap between the OSCT and the DCLG in the delivery of Prevent. Thus, 
each held its own Prevent budget, while the DCLG also assumed responsibility for the 
delivery of Community Cohesion policy. Actors within the OSCT and the DCLG had, 
however, somewhat different conceptualisations of Muslim community engagement 
through Prevent (O’Toole et al., 2012). The view within the DCLG tended to see faith 
communities as resources in the delivery of Cohesion and welfare (Dinham and Lowndes, 
2008), emphasising the need to identify key stakeholders and engage ‘hard-to-reach’ 
groups within governance networks. As one senior adviser to the DCLG, Maqsood 
Ahmed, explained to us: ‘I was involved in the Prevent and when I say Prevent, it was 
less to do with the counter-terrorism, more to do with how do we establish connection 
with the Muslim community; how do we capacity build in the community’, and in ways 
which went beyond ‘the “usual suspects” who are always on the Government table’. In 
contrast, a senior civil servant in the OSCT told us:
In the early days, I had no idea that this job would involve community engagement. There were 
a few reasons for that: one, no-one had told me, and two, the organisation was new and we 
hadn’t designed it into the principles.
There was evidence of a turf-war between these departments in the delivery of Prevent, 
as the senior OSCT civil servant suggested:
The DCLG regarded it as their job to have those contacts: to the point where they didn’t 
particularly want us to have them. I think if truth be told, they were also slightly apprehensive 
that we would come in with size 12 security boots and sort of damage the contacts that they 
were creating.
Ultimately, he suggested, the OSCT had used its power and resources to dominate the 
interpretation and delivery of Prevent:
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Because we arrived in a rather security-like way with a very determined delivery plan, 
occasionally people were just run off the court. They didn’t have as much money. They didn’t, 
frankly, have as much drive. They didn’t quite know what they were doing. And it was hard. So 
what happened was Prevent took over Cohesion.
Consequently, a fairly underdeveloped model of community engagement became increas-
ingly dominated by a more focused security agenda. According to the OSCT officer: ‘We 
made a fundamental mistake three years ago with Prevent. I thought that we would be able 
to place Prevent on top of a rich seam of dialogue with Muslim communities. My mistake 
was that that seam didn’t exist.’ Echoing this analysis, a former Secretary of State at the 
DCLG, John Denham, revealed to us: ‘I found in the CLG, after some very rigorous 
examinations with officials, that there was no understood model of how Prevent was 
meant to work.’ This left Prevent prone to domination by security actors and issues – but 
rather than driven by a unified, coherent governing project, this was an outcome of inter-
nal struggles between political professionals over its definition and implementation.
This issue of overlap between Prevent and Cohesion, and the consequences of this 
for Cohesion, came to the fore in a House of Commons enquiry into Prevent, which 
recommended their future separation. This critique informed the incoming Coalition 
government’s review of Prevent in 2010, which acknowledged that overlap between the 
two had ‘led to accusations that the government’s interest in Muslim communities is 
related only to the risk of terrorism’ (Home Office, 2010). Subsequently, the revised 
Prevent strategy that was announced in June 2011 stipulated that Prevent and Cohesion 
would henceforth be separated – with the Home Office leading Prevent and the DCLG 
leading Cohesion policy – although as we discuss later, this separation is unlikely to be 
maintained in practice.
A second issue identified by the 2011 revised Prevent strategy related to the govern-
ment’s conceptualisation of ‘extremism’, and its engagement with ‘moderate’ and 
‘extremist’ Muslim groups and actors. New Labour’s position on this question shifted. 
On the one hand, they condemned ‘intolerant’ and extremist perspectives while seeking 
out and supporting ‘moderate’, ‘mainstream’ Muslims. On the other hand, they attempted 
to differentiate between ‘extremist’ and ‘violent extremist’ positions in order to engage 
pragmatically with non-violent ‘extremist’ Islamist organisations (Birt, 2009: 54). One 
former Home Secretary (2004–2006), Charles Clarke, in interview, confirmed that within 
the New Labour government there was little clarity or consensus on this issue:
there was not a clear approach to what needed to be done, but there was a wide range of 
different views, there was confusion over some leaders of some of the communities and in 
particular, confusion about the extent to which we should, in any sense, compromise with some 
of the forces which have deep, deep, deep roots and a lack of appreciation of the nature of our 
democratic society in which we live […] I do think it was an issue where we didn’t have a 
coherence about what we thought was the right way of dealing with this question.
This lack of clarity was confirmed by a former policy adviser to the DCLG, Francis 
Davis, who commented that there was ‘no real kind of clear basis upon which one can 
decide who’s in and who’s out. So you get Hazel [Blears] throwing MCB6 out and you 
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get John [Denham] and the team working very hard to get them back in.’ In his speech to 
the Munich Security Conference in 2011, David Cameron (2011) signalled a hardened 
stance on this issue, declaring: ‘instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we – as gov-
ernments and as societies – have got to confront it, in all its forms’. Cameron’s ‘muscular 
liberalism’ has ostensibly prevailed in the new Prevent strategy in its stipulation that 
government will no longer engage with ‘extremists’, including non-violent extremists 
(that is, non-violent Islamists or Salafis), who do not subscribe to core liberal values 
(Home Office, 2011: 23–24). This stance, however, has not been shared by other 
Ministers in the Coalition, with divisions crossing party lines (Oborne, 2011), nor has it 
been shared by key civil servants within the OSCT, as one senior officer told us at the 
time of the Prevent review:
I don’t want to be dealing with extremism per se anywhere. I don’t think it’s right for us as a 
counter-terrorism team to be doing that. […] Extremism isn’t illegal in this country and we’re 
not the right people to deal with that. We must get involved where extremism is leading people 
on the road to terrorism.
Indeed, our study found there was significant scepticism over whether this stipulation 
can be implemented. As one Muslim adviser to the Home Office recounted to us in late 
2012:
I just went to a meeting two weeks ago and the Home Office is still working with those groups. 
[…] if you want to reach hardline Salafi communities, you have to work with hardline Salafi 
people, that’s just the way it is. You’re not going to reach them through cuddly Sufis. There’s a 
sense of realpolitik about this whole thing.
Such conflicts over core issues relating to the rationale of Prevent contributed to a sense 
that Prevent was unfocused (Birt, 2009), and consequently, less cohesive than often 
imagined. This was a charge levelled particularly at New Labour’s strategy. While the 
Coalition’s strategy lays out a stronger line on eschewing non-liberal ‘extremist’ groups 
and seeks to mobilise a range of front-line services (including charities, universities and 
health services) in pre-emptively responding to extremism, in practice this stance is also 
less coherent than it appears, as we discuss below.
Local Reception and Implementation of Prevent
Perceptions of the unfocused nature of Prevent under Labour were very prevalent at the 
local level. In part, this was encouraged by the somewhat open-ended nature of Prevent 
guidance, which gave local authorities leeway to interpret and implement Prevent as 
they saw fit. As John Denham (2013), later reflected: ‘With no clear national guidance 
on forging allies against terrorism, mistakes were inevitable […] Despite this, Prevent 
did good work in areas where people worked through the challenges for themselves’. 
Local Authorities often reworked Prevent to fit local priorities, and, as Lowndes and 
Thorp (2010: 124) show, local contexts were important in shaping the outcomes of 
Prevent – notwithstanding ‘the intensity of national debate and the apparent “top–
down” character of the agenda’. Lowndes and Thorp (2010: 124) also focus on the 
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‘creative and often surprising interplay’ between central strategies and local agency in 
their study of the implementation of the Prevent Pathfinder programme of 2007–2008 
in three Midlands cities, which served as the pilot phase of the Prevent programme that 
followed. They found that models of community engagement varied significantly across 
the three cities – from community safety, community cohesion to community develop-
ment approaches – reflecting their different logics, histories and pre-existing structures 
of community engagement.
Prevent was met with considerable opposition by many local authorities, as other 
studies have documented (Thomas, 2012). In particular, several local authorities in areas 
that were targeted for Prevent funding were reluctant to adopt National Indicator 35 
(NI35) – the government’s national assessment framework for monitoring resilience to 
violent extremism. As the minutes of a Local Government Association (LGA) meeting of 
2008 recorded: ‘Local authorities are reluctant to pick up the indicator because the term 
“violent extremism” could alienate communities, undermining cohesion work and are 
extremely cautious about making public statements around PVE’ (cited in Khan, 2009: 
8). Husband and Alam’s (2011) study of Prevent in West Yorkshire found that it encoun-
tered ‘strong resistance’ from local authority personnel, with one senior councillor in 
their study denouncing Prevent as ‘racist’ (2011: 147). In Bradford, the Council initially 
refused to accept Prevent funding, but did eventually although, as a former Conservative 
Bradford council leader, Kris Hopkins, explained to us, not to implement Prevent 
objectives:
And so you ended up with a situation where we [Bradford Council] were out there […] trying 
to gain the confidence of a very fragile community7 through PR interventions around 
Community Cohesion, and at the same time we were being asked to be an arm of the security 
services, to respond under the direction of the NI35 directives. And we just refused to play. And 
they said well you can’t have the Prevent money unless you play, so we said […] keep your 
Prevent money, we’ll spend our own reserves to do more Community Cohesion work. And 
eventually they gave us the Prevent money anyway.
Across our three local case study areas of Leicester, Tower Hamlets and Birmingham, 
we found considerable variation in the ways in which Prevent was conceptualised, 
received and implemented under New Labour. Significantly, we find that variation con-
tinues under the Coalition’s revised Prevent strategy – despite attempts to enforce a more 
focused and centralised approach.
In Leicester, when Prevent was launched in 2007, the local council refused to accept 
the terminology of Prevent, rebranding it ‘Mainstreaming Moderation’. Largely because 
it is host to a substantial Gujarati population with significant numbers of Hindus, Sikhs 
and Muslims, local governance in Leicester has since the 1990s had a strong multi-faith 
ethos, which Prevent’s exclusive focus on Muslims placed at risk (Open Society Institute, 
2010). To mitigate this, the strategy was reconceived to include all forms of extremism 
– despite local perceptions of opposition to this from central government. In 2011, the 
elected mayor went further, refusing to accept a Home Office funded Prevent Officer 
within the Council. This led to Prevent being co-ordinated by a local Church-led multi-
faith centre, St Philips Centre, in partnership with the city’s Muslim umbrella body, the 
Federation of Muslim Organisations (St Philip’s Centre, 2012). St Philip’s Centre is one 
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of the more significant non-governmental bodies in Leicester. With a background in 
Cohesion work, it currently delivers the Coalition’s flagship integration programme, 
Near Neighbours. It is thus unlikely that Prevent and Cohesion can or will be separated 
in Leicester as the new Prevent strategy directs. Indeed, the Centre’s Director maintained 
in interview: ‘if you are going to tackle issues of extremism you have actually got to 
address issues of integration as well. The reality is they do belong together’, while the 
Deputy Director observed: ‘St Phillip’s […] is an organisation which has developed its 
reputation on interfaith relationships. The Home Office knows that and is happy with 
that. What other option did they have, you could argue!’ In practice, then, Prevent in 
Leicester maintains a close relationship with Cohesion.
In Tower Hamlets, the local council was initially cautious, but not hostile, towards 
Prevent. Its implementation of Prevent tended to place strong emphasis on projects with 
a Community Cohesion orientation, with 24 out of 28 projects focused on broad Cohesion 
aims rather than more security-related issues (Iacopini et al., 2011). Following the launch 
of the revised Prevent strategy, projects proposed by Tower Hamlets in 2012 were 
rejected by the Home Office as too ‘Cohesion oriented’. Nevertheless, Tower Hamlets 
council has been pursuing its own locally shaped projects – such as the ‘No Place for 
Hate’ programme, which excludes extremist preachers, but emphasises local cohesion in 
the face of threats from the far right – and therefore overlap remains. Significantly, Tower 
Hamlets also opted out of the Channel programme8 – setting up its own programme that 
is accountable to local authority and policing structures rather than directly to SO15 (the 
counter-terrorism command within the Metropolitan Police). Despite central govern-
ment’s bar on working with Islamists, in Tower Hamlets the East London Mosque 
(ELM), often vilified from outside as an Islamist mosque, maintains its position as a key 
institution locally. It is deeply embedded in local governance networks and the largest 
non-governmental provider of local services. Thus, it would be difficult, indeed counter-
productive, for local government to disengage from the ELM.
In Birmingham, the city council initially implemented Prevent with cooperation from 
some Muslim organisations. But, perceptions that Prevent was police-led arose quite early 
on, not least, as noted above, because of the secondment of a counter-terrorism police 
officer into the council’s equalities division to lead Prevent. By 2010, suspicion towards 
Prevent had intensified as a consequence of ‘Project Champion’. While not itself a Prevent 
initiative, Project Champion did much to undermine the implementation of Prevent in the 
city. Project Champion was a police surveillance operation involving installation of 216 
CCTV and ANPR (overt and covert) cameras in two areas of Muslim settlement, creating 
a ‘surveillance ring’ around these areas. Importantly, the counter-terrorism purpose of the 
cameras was concealed from local residents, and the cameras were badged as a ‘crime 
safety initiative’ with little, and deeply flawed, community consultation. Furthermore, 
Fussey (2013) found serious divergences among the coalition of professionals involved in 
Project Champion, in terms of their knowledge of and support for the project. The true 
purpose of Project Champion was revealed by civil society campaigners (Jolly, 2010) 
with damaging implications for Prevent. By the time Prevent was revised and re-launched 
in 2011, there were very high levels of suspicion towards Prevent, with few projects 
underway, such that in the words of one of our interviewees, ‘Prevent is dead in this city.’
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At the local level, then, there were differing perceptions of Prevent, with implications 
for its reception, delivery and impact, with local actors modifying, challenging and 
resisting Prevent, such that in practice it varied from one locality to another and often 
diverged from centrally articulated policy.
Muslim Civil Society Responses to Prevent
A third much-neglected area in the study of the implications of Prevent has been the 
responses of Muslim civil society actors to the models of community engagement 
developed through Prevent. Our study uncovered a range of responses, from qualified 
cooperation, to appropriation of aspects of Prevent (including funding) for more auton-
omous objectives, to participating after renegotiating the terms of engagement offered 
by government, to challenge, protest and exit. Many actors shifted positions across 
these range of responses.
A very common response of Muslim organisations and actors was a simple refusal to 
engage with Prevent. Birt (2009), for example, reports that the Lancashire Council of 
Mosques refused funding because the scope of Contest 2 was too broad in its focus on 
Muslims in general. This objection was a very common one, and increasingly augmented 
by widespread suspicion of Prevent as a surveillance programme (Husband and Alam, 
2011). Thus, even some Muslims who might have welcomed the funding that Prevent 
provided were dissuaded from engaging with Prevent because of its stigmatising associa-
tions and fears about its covert aims. There were also Muslim groups and organisations 
that had engaged with the relatively more open-ended Pathfinder programme in 2007–
2008, but decided against participating in any further Prevent activity – despite the pos-
sibilities that such a tranche of funding might enable. As one member of a Muslim 
organisation, the Cordoba Foundation in London, which had been a recipient of Prevent 
funding, commented:
I won’t touch [Prevent funding] with a two metre bar and no-one will. No-one of any decency 
will and that’s a big problem. That’s a huge problem because we ought to be [making use of 
funding]. This is public funds for the public good. Why aren’t we using it? We can’t because 
now it’s poisoned.
Some who had engaged during the Pathfinder year, had done so with reluctance, but had 
also sought to renegotiate the terms of their engagement, as Humera Khan, in discussing 
the involvement of her community organisation, An-Nisa Society, explained:
we took money in the Pathfinder year. We were persuaded by our youth service and diversity 
team, because they didn’t have anybody else who had the ability to run a project. […] We said 
we would only do it on the condition that it’s not sold as a Prevent project. We’re not going to 
do Prevent work, we’re going to do community development […] we want it to be as a basis to 
start a dialogue with you as a council.
Subsequently, however, An-Nisa refused to engage any further with Prevent, and published 
a highly critical report arguing that Prevent was flawed on a number of grounds, including: 
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‘its targeting of the whole Muslim community as potential terrorists’; ‘the fusion of counter 
terrorism with community cohesion and community development initiatives’; ‘the main-
streaming of Prevent in the core services of local councils’; its ‘heavy surveillance focus’, 
its ‘confusing and unclear’ strategy; the role of ‘ill equipped councils’ in attempting to 
intervene ‘in a highly sensitive area’; the loss of credibility and trust incurred by those 
grass-roots Muslim groups who accepted Prevent funding; and the lack of concerted gov-
ernment action on tackling social exclusion among Muslims (Khan, 2009: 4–5).
Several organisations used their expertise and positions as gatekeepers to particular 
groups as negotiation tools to insist on their own terms of engagement. As Abdul Haqq 
Baker, the organiser of the STREET (Strategy to Reach Empower and Educate Teenagers) 
project in Brixton explained:
STREET, I think, became a very powerful tool to show the effective engagement and 
partnership, especially partnership, with government entities, whether they be local or central, 
and NGO institutions was possible. But the key area here was that it was negotiated on equal 
terms. There were some terms that I would not accept from local partners […] e.g. the police 
and other statutory organisations saying you need to inform them and provide reports on your 
target audience. I said I won’t do that, that’s not going to happen, and I’m prepared to walk 
away from any agreement on that basis, because of the confidentiality, because of the credibility 
that we’ve got with such individuals.
In other areas, there were cases of more open confrontation and protest against certain 
counter-terrorism measures. In Birmingham, this was particularly manifested in the 
campaign against ‘Project Champion’ that adopted the name Birmingham Against Spy 
Cameras (BASC). This was a concerted, successful grass-roots campaign by Muslim 
and non-Muslim activists to identify and dismantle the cameras. Their action forced a 
public apology from West Midlands Police, followed by the hooding of the cameras and 
ultimately their removal (and see Fussey, 2013).
A number of activists in our study who had worked with the government on Prevent 
had voiced their objections to the logics or practices of Prevent, with many withdrawing 
from engagement with Prevent or Channel or other counter-terrorism initiatives that 
sought Muslim cooperation. We found a range of exit strategies. For instance, one 
Muslim mentor in Birmingham who had been working with the OSCT on the Channel 
programme quietly withdrew from the scheme because he felt unable to sign up to their 
‘Individual Values’ form.9 Other exit strategies were more public and openly challeng-
ing. An-Nisa’s exit from Prevent was, as noted above, accompanied by the publication of 
a highly critical report. Similarly, a prominent member of the government-established 
National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group, Shaista Gohir, resigned from the group and 
issued a public denunciation of the Brown government’s approach to engaging with 
Muslim women (Gohir, 2010). We found instances of actors exiting Prevent and 
attempting to establish their own alternative initiatives, including an attempt by com-
munity activists in Birmingham to establish an alternative, autonomous Muslim self-
organised Prevent programme, which eschewed government funding or involvement 
and was distinctive in its critical focus on both UK foreign policy and al-Qaeda’s 
ideology and tactics.
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Conclusion
In this article, we have focused on the implications of state engagement with Muslims 
through the prism of Prevent. We opened by identifying tensions between two conceptu-
alisations of governance: one as a disciplinary mode of regulation and the other as 
contested practice. In the literature, the former is pervasive. Undeniably, much of the logic 
of Prevent has been disciplinary in its aims and as such, this has had enormous symbolic 
and discursive effect. Nevertheless, we suggest that the latter is also in operation, as 
attending empirically to how different actors responded to Prevent reveals: its policy log-
ics were often inconsistent, while its practices were messier and more contested than 
many studies have allowed. Engaging with ideas of practice opens up the possibility that 
while the state may initiate engagement in problematic ways and with limited offers of 
participation, actors across governance arenas may not necessarily comply with these log-
ics of engagement. As such, we contest the view that Prevent can be seen straightfor-
wardly as a form of discipline given its contradictory, incoherent, and contested practice.
Nevertheless, Prevent did underwrite what Archer (2009: 332) cites as a ‘politics of 
unease’ around Muslims in British society, which, following Huysmans and Buonfino, 
he describes as a ‘patchwork of insecurities that facilitate the policy exchange of fears 
and beliefs’ across a range of governance domains. Such ‘policy exchange’ occurred 
because there was, as Birt (2009: 57) points out, ‘an inadequate firewall’ between Prevent 
and Pursue, and as Alam and Husband (2013) argue, the multi-agency nature of delivery 
enabled such permeation, while prior to 2010 the operational overlap between Prevent 
and Cohesion carried security concerns over into the implementation of Cohesion and 
integration strategies. As our data show, in these circumstances, where there were asym-
metric relations between the OSCT and the DCLG, security issues overrode other con-
cerns and approaches – but this was not based necessarily on a consensual understanding 
of Prevent. Further, we have argued, Prevent was rejected, modified, contested and 
opposed by Muslim civil society and governance actors on the ground. Under the new 
strategy, Prevent and Cohesion have, in policy terms at least, been separated (although 
we suggested in practice this separation is incomplete). However, there is potential for 
Prevent to leach into other policy areas due to the new strategy’s focus on institutions and 
sectors and its goal to charge front-line personnel in schools, universities, health services 
and charities with Prevent delivery. While it is likely that Prevent will continue to be 
patchy, contested and/or resisted by governance actors, professionals10 and citizens 
within those sectors and institutions, it has the potential to facilitate ‘a policy exchange 
of fears and beliefs’ across governance domains and entrench further a ‘politics of 
unease’ about Muslims in British society.
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Notes
 1. This project was part of the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society programme: http://www.
religionandsociety.org.uk/.
 2. For a full list of interviewees see O’Toole et al. (2013: Appendix 1).
 3. The study operated a strategy of differential disclosure, where respondents were given the 
option of being reported by name, general role, anonymously or not reported/cited directly at 
all, and in relation to all or parts of their interview data.
 4. Between 2008 and 2011, the DCLG budget for Prevent was £66.760 million according to a 
detailed response by the DCLG to a Freedom of Information request in 2011: see https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-funding. Between 2009 and 2011, Home Office fund-
ing came to £84 million, while FCO funding came to £36 million: see Home Office (2011).
 5. These provisions grant the authorities the power to stop, search and hold individuals without 
the need to provide grounds.
 6. Founded in 1997, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) is the UK’s largest Muslim umbrella 
organisation.
 7. This is a reference to the 2001 disturbances in Bradford (and the nearby towns of Burnley and 
Oldham), which were characterised as ethnic conflicts that stemmed from patterns of segrega-
tion among Asian and white communities.
 8. Channel is a multi-agency programme that aims to identify individuals ‘at risk from radicali-
sation’ and develop support plans for them – often involving mentors. See the government’s 
Channel guidance, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/118194/channel-guidance.pdf.
 9. Mentors participating in Channel were required to sign a Statement of Individual Values form 
that included questions on the putative mentor’s attitudes towards equalities, democracy, reli-
gious tolerance, homosexuality, ethnic and religious pluralism, violent protest and ‘support 
for armed resistance against British troops overseas’.
10. For example, in response to a new policy ‘issued by NHS England to all health authorities’ 
stipulating that ‘GP practices must train a lead member of staff to recognise patients who could 
become or have become linked to terror groups’, the chair of the Royal College of General 
Practitioners stated: ‘It is completely disproportionate and a poor use of GP resources and time. 
It is effectively asking GPs to be a government intelligence agency’ (Johnston, 2014).
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